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KENTUCKY LAW JOtJ1NAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
UNDER THE KENTUCKY WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
Kentucky has by statute provided for judicial review of the orders
of the Workmen's Compensation Board. The statute' provides that an
order or award of the Workmen's Compensation Board shall be con-
clusive and binding as to all questions of fact. On review, no new or
additional evidence may be introduced in the circuit court except as
to fraud or misconduct of some person engaged in the administration
of Workmen's Compensation which affects the order. Otherwise, the
court shall hear the cause upon the record and dispose of it in a sum-
mary manner, limiting its determination to whether or not:
(a) The board acted without or in excess of its powers;
(b) The order, decision or award was procured by fraud;
(c) The order, decision or award is not in conformity to
the provisions of this chapter and;
(d) If findings of fact are in issue, whether such findings
support the order, decision or award.
A majority of the cases appealed to the courts have questioned
the fact finding of the board, contending in most cases that the board's
award or order is not supported by the evidence. The courts review
the cases under the authority of subsection (d) of Kentucky Revised
Statutes section 342.285 (3), which has been interpreted as giving
them the power to determine whether the fact finding of the board is
supported by the evidence.2 In making these determinations the courts
have stated the rule that it is not within their authority to weigh the
evidence, but only to determine if the order is supported by substantial
evidence or competent evidence having probative value.3 Substantial
evidence has been defined as something of substance and relevant
consequence,4 that which tends to establish the fact in issue and which
does not rest on mere surmise or guess,5 or such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.0
'KY. REV. STAT. sec. 342.285 (1953).
2 Tyler-Couch Construction Co. v. Elmore, 264 S.W. 2d 56 (Ky. 1954). There
could also be review under the court's inherent right to review questions of law.
Where the finding is not based on evidence, the award is not a finding of fact
upon an issue in the evidence, but an erroneous conclusion of law, and therefore
subject to review. See Jellico Coal Mining Co. v. Chatfield, 200 Ky. 842, 255 S.W.
842 (1923).
2 Mills v. Casner, 296 Ky. 678, 178 S.W. 2d 196 (1944); Frazier v. Ky.-
Jellico Coal Co., 296 Ky. 777, 178 S.W. 2d 601 (1944).
'Farmer Motor Co. v. Smith, 253 Ky. 151, 69 S.W. 2d 1 (1934); Broadway
& Fourth Ave. Realty Co. v. Metcalfe, 230 Ky. 800, 20 S.W. 2d 988 (1929);
Moore v. Louisville Hydroelectric Co., 223 Ky. 710, 4 S.W. 2d 701 (1928).
'Black Motor Co. v. Spicer, 290 Ky. 111, 160 S.W. 2d 336 (1942).
'American Rolling Mill Co. v. Pack, 278 Ky. 175, 128 S.W. 2d 187 (1939).
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In considering what is competent evidence having probative value,
it is well to note that hearsay evidence is admissible but alone will not
support an award. Rather, there must be some reliable and substantial
evidence as understood by common law rules of evidence.1 This resi-
dum of "legal" evidence can be supplied by either direct or circum-
stantial evidence,8 but there must be more than a scintilla.9 This was
brought out in Koppers Coal Co. v. Comptom,10 where the court said
that they were not bound to affirm the award because there might be
some competent evidence or testimony in the record to support it if
the evidence is manifestly insufficient to support the conclusion.
Self-serving testimony of an employee, contradicted by testimony
of fellow employees, if believed by the board, will support an award.
Such was the case in C. Lee Cook Mfg. Co. v. Hodges," where the
court, quoting from American Rolling Mill Co. v. Pack, said evidence
sufficient to sustain a finding of the board ".... means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept an adequate to support a
conclusion, ... and must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a
jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be
drawn from it is one of fact for the jury."12 Here the court concluded
it would not be justified in directing a verdict and the evidence was
sufficient. In Madden v. Black Mountain Corp.,13 it was stated that it
takes less evidence to sustain a finding of the board than to sustain a
verdict of the jury. Here the testimony of the deceased employee's
mother, not objected to and not concerning verbal transactions with
or acts by deceased, was competent even in her own behalf.
In Yeager v. Mengal Co.,'4 the testimony of two doctors as to what
the employee had told them while they were treating him was suf-
ficient to support the board's order. Several fellow employees had
testified that the claimant had been hit by a piece of wood which was
thrown from a machine, thus cutting a small place behind his ear. The
doctors testified that while they were treating the employee he told
them he had a pimple behind his ear which had been treated by a
nurse and opened by a private doctor, but did not mention that he
had been hit behind his ear while working. The court said "the board
can reject the theory of the case of either side and be controlled by the
'Valentine v. Weaver, 191 Ky. 37, 228 S.W. 1036 (1921).8 Wisconsin Coal Corp. v. Haddix, 289 Ky. 676, 134 S.W. 2d 232 (1939).
Black Mountain Corp. v. Hobbs, 308 Ky. 731, 215 S.W. 2d 273 (1948).
20285 Ky. 844, 149 S.W. 2d 548 (1941)
304 Ky. 9, 199 S.W. 2d 635 (1947).
"Id. at 12, 199 S.W. 2d at 636.
238 Ky. 53, 36 S.W. 2d 848 (1931).
"260 Ky. 156, 84 S.W. 2d 6 (1935).
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evidence or theory of the other side, even though the testimony is
meager or merely of a negative character, provided such evidence is
of any probative value or character having the effect of proof."1
Codell Construction Co. v. Neal'6 held that there did not have to
be direct evidence of the fact that death arose out of employment, if
the evidence produced would reasonably sustain an inference or raise
a presumption of the fact. The employee here was a night watchman
for the construction company and was burned to death in a shack in
which he warmed himself. The watchman had been accustomed to
making trinkets and shellacking them while on duty, and two open
cans of shellack were found in the burned shack. There was no dispute
as to the material facts but a sharp dispute as to the inference to be
drawn from these facts. The court said, "An award may not be
predicated upon a possibility which is mere surmise and conjecture,
but it may be predicated upon evidence from which reasonable and
legitimate inferences may be deduced." 17 The evidence here was suf-
ficient to sustain the inference that he was burned to death while per-
forming his duties as nightwatchman and not while engaged in activity
for his own benefit.
Many of the Workmen's Compensation cases are determined upon
and involve a weighing of medical testimony. It has been held that a
doctor's opinion evidence is sufficient to sustain an award.'8 There
also is authority for the proposition that whether or not death is the
proximate result of an injury can be established only by the testimony
of experts skilled in the medical and surgical profession, they being
the only witnesses qualified to testify or express an opinion as to
cause of death.19 However, this rule has been qualified, and an award
can be sustained without medical testimony and even in contradiction
of medical testimony. This was brought out in Consolidation Coal Co.
v. Marcum's Adr, 20 where eight doctors testified that the claimant
was suffering from hardening of the arteries and high blood pressure,
and that his condition was not caused by inhaling noxious gases.
Claimant testified as to the condition of the air at his place of work,
and his testimony that the ventilation was bad and that noxious
gases were present was corroborated by a fellow employee. There
15Id. at 162, 84 S.W. 2d at 8.10258 Ky. 603, 80 S.W. 2d 530 (1935).
11Id. at 609, 80 S.W. 2d at 533.
' Fordson Coal Co. v. Bledsoe, 236 Ky. 409, 33 S.W. 2d 302 (1930); Tackett
v. Eastern Coal Corp. 295 Ky. 422, 174 S.W. 2d 707 (1943).
'5City of Owensboro v. Day, 284 Ky. 644, 145 S.W. 2d 856 (1940); Hardy-
Burlingham Mining Co. v. Hurt, 253 Ky. 534, 69 S.W. 2d 1030 (1934).
289 Ky. 220, 158 S.W. 2d 150 (1941).
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was testimony that the claimant was in good health before inhaling
the gases and was able to do an average day's work, but that since
then he had become weak and unable to do any work in a gainful
occupation. The court concluded that there was sufficient testimony
to establish that there was impure air in the room where claimant was
working, and the ensuing circumstances were enough to reasonably
conclude that the condition was caused by breathing bad air. The
court said:
Although the opinions of physicians, skilled in their profession, will
be given great weight by the courts, we are of the opinion that
neither the medical nor any other of the sciences has yet reached the
stage of infallibility; and, where circumstances are shown which, if
true, would tend to cast some doubt as to the correctness of the
opinion of the experts, the issue resolves itself into one of fact to be
determined by the board. Opinion or expert evidence is neither con-
clusive nor controlling as against evidence of facts.
21
Medical testimony is not required to prove extent and duration of
disability. City of Olive Hill v. Parsons2 2 held that disability is a ques-
tion of fact to be determined by the board, and no rule is known which
requires the employee to produce medical proof.
In relatively few cases have the courts found the fact finding of
the board not supported by substantial evidence, and some of these
are interesting to show the situation where perhaps the evidence will
not be considered sufficient. In American Rolling Mill Co. v. Pack,
2 3
the employee was seeking to recover for disability caused by tubercu-
losis which he contended resulted from breathing noxious gases while
employed by appellant. It was admitted that the inhalation of the
gas irritated and inflamed the tissue of plaintiff's lungs and the
mucous membrane of his nose, mouth and throat. The plaintifl's
doctor testified that such irritation and inflammation made the ground
fertile for the tubercular bacilli, and that this might have caused the
plaintiff's tubercular condition. But the doctor did not testify that it
did cause the plaintiff to have tuberculosis. The employee worked
for seven months after inhaling the gas and then was striken by a
severe attack of influenza only a month or two before being diagnosed
as tubercular. The doctor testified that influenza is often followed by
tuberculosis. None of the ninety to one-hundred other men working
around the gas contracted tuberculosis. The court concluded that
where only one out of one-hundred makes such claims it cannot be
said that there is a direct connection between the inhalation of gas
Id. at 225, 158 S.W. 2d at 152.
=-306 Ky. 83, 206 S.W. 2d 41 (1947).
' Supra note 6.
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and the plaintiffs tubercular condition, especially when he worked
seven months after inhaling the gas and then had an attack of influenza.
It was perhaps important here that the plaintiffs doctor did not state
that in his opinion the plaintiff's condition was caused by breathing
the gases, but rather stated that it was possible that the gases caused
the condition. Perhaps if such a positive opinion had been expressed,
the board's award would have been upheld.
In Clear Branch Mining Co. v. Holbrook,2 4 the court found the
order not supported by substantial evidence. The contention was that
the employee died from breathing "bad air" while working in a mine.
Testimony established that the trap doors were open in the section
of the mine where deceased was working and that it was necessary
to keep the doors closed in order, generally, to maintain air currents
throughout the mine. There was testimony that other employees com-
plained of lack of air but no one knew of the condition of the air at
the place where deceased was working. As no one testified as to the
condition of the air where deceased was working, the court concluded
there was a total absence of proof of any causal connection between
bad air and the employee's death.
In Marian Mining Co. v. Bowling,25 the board found no dependency
existed, and on review the court reversed on the ground the holding
was not supported by evidence. The court stated the testimony of
dependency was vague, uncertain, and unsatisfactory, and consisted
mostly of conclusions of witnesses instead of facts, but this did show
some dependency, there being no testimony to the contrary. Evidently,
though the board does not believe the testimony of the claimant, in
order to hold against him, there must be some evidence to support a
contrary conclusion.
In summary, the courts have, as a general rule, refused to weigh
the evidence on review and have sustained the findings of the board
when supported by substantial evidence. It seems that they have taken
a rather liberal view of what is substantial evidence. In the realm of
fact finding the courts have not invaded the province of the Workmen's
Compensation Board, and the court's statement in Frennie May Coal
Co. v. Snow 2 6 pretty well indicates its attitude toward the board's
finding of fact. There the court said, "In Workrnen's Compensation
cases, as is well known, by virtue of the statutes, the findings of fact,
present and forseeable, must be given greater consideration by the
courts than the verdict of a jury."21 Also, the court said that if they
2 47 S.W. 2d 48 (Ky. 1953).
8239 Ky. 724, 40 S.W. 2d 370 (1931).
'312 Ky. 580, 229 S.W. 2d 56 (1950).
Id. at 583, 229 S.W. 2d at 58.
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were sitting as the initial authority in this case, they would have come
to a different conclusion than that of the Workmen's Compensation
Board, but in explaining their action the court said, "The board is com-
posed of men of training and experience in such matters and they
doubtless arrived at their decision through bringing to bear their
experience and observations in connection with the professional
opinions of the doctors, even as does a jury. This they had the right
to do."28 With this attitude, the courts have been reluctant to over-
turn the fact findings of the board where there is some evidence to
support the order.
The Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Act provides in detail the
scope of judicial review of orders of the Workmen's Compensation
Board but does not specifically mention review of questions of law,
though the court's inherent right to review questions of law seems to
be beyond dispute. Most questions of law can be reviewed by the
courts under the power given to them to determine whether the board
acted "without or in excess of its power," and also under the statute
provision giving them the power to determine whether the order,
decision or award is "in conformity with the provisions of the act."
The statute leaves unsolved one of the principal problems of review-
the extent of review of the application of legal concepts to undisputed
or established facts.
The Kentucky courts have, as a general rule, held that where the
facts are undisputed, the question presented is one of law in which
the courts can and should substitute their judgment for that of the
board.20 Where the facts are undisputed, the Kentucky courts have
reviewed the board's determination as one of law in situations involving
a determination of whether the injury arose out of or in the course of
employment. Included in the scope of the issue are such determina-
tions as: Was the injury traceable to an accident which occurred
within the employment?30 Was the claimant at the time of the accident
within the course of his employment?31 Was dependency established?
3 2
Should total or partial disability have been awarded?33 Had horseplay
ended and was employee back within the scope of his employment at
Ibid.
oLouisville and Jefferson County Air Board v. Riddle, 810 Ky. 100, 190 S.W.
2d 1009 (1945); Hinkle v. Allen-Code]] Co., 298 Ky. 102, 182 S.W. 2d 20 (1944);
Bates and Rogers Const. Co. v. Allen, 183 Ky. 815, 210 S.W. 467 (1919).
'Joseph W. Greathouse Co. v. Yenowine, 302 Ky. 159, 193 S.W. 2d 758
(1946).
Supra note 28.
Columbus Mining Co. v. Pelfrey, 237 S.W. 2d 847 (Ky. 1951)."Central Truckaway System v. May, 299 Ky. 85, 184 S.W. 2d 889 (1945).
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the time of the accident? 4 And did the employer have knowledge of
the injury?35
Only in the area where it is necessary to determine whether the
relationship of employee or independent contractor exists is there
authority for the proposition that the courts will defer to the judg-
ment of the board and review such determinations only to see if they
were supported by the evidence. The case of Vires v. Dawkins Log
and Mill Co.8 6 involved a suit by claimant, an employee of Fugate
Brothers, against Dawkins. The suit was dismissed upon the ground
that Fugate Brothers were independent contractors and therefore
Dawkins was not liable. The court said:
It is tacitly conceded that Fugate Bros. were independent contractors,
and the evidence in that respect was uncontradicted. The finding of
the board to that effect was supported by the evidence, and in that
situation, the result reached by the board is conclusive upon the
courts.3
7
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Petty38 seems to be in accord with
this case, although the opinion is somewhat confusing. The court said:
There being, as stated supra, no substantial conflict in this evidence
in reference to what was the employment or relationship between the
parties, under such circumstances the finding of the board was a
finding of law, which we are here called upon to review and deter-
mine whether its finding was sustained by evidence of probative
value.8
9
Opposed to this view are two earlier cases, 40 where the court reviewed
as a question of law the board's determination on undisputed facts
whether the relationship of employee or independent contractor
existed. These cases seem never to have been expressly overruled,
and the exact state of the law on this particular point is in doubt.
The Vires and Aetna Casualty cases seem to be inconsistent with
the general rule of the court that where the facts are undisputed, the
question presented is one of law, in which the court should substitute
its judgment for that of the board. The court's theory and reasons for
departing from the general rule in these two cases are not clear, and
any attempt to explain their action will involve mere speculation.
Whether or not a court will substitute its judgment for that of the
administrative agency is largely within the discretion of the court
Rex-Pyramid Oil Co. v. Magan, 287 Ky. 459, 153 S.W. 2d 895 (1941).
Bates and Rogers Construction Co. v. Allen supra note 29.
' 240 Ky. 550, 42 S.W. 2d 721 (1931).
Id. at 552, 42 S.W. 2d at 722.
282 Ky. 716, 140 S.W. 2d 397 (1940).
Id. at 720, 140 S.W. 2d at 399.
4°Raponi v. Consolidation Coal Co., 224 Ky. 167, 5 S.W. 2d 1043 (1928);
Diamond Block Coal Co. v. Sparks, 209 Ky. 73, 272 S.W. 31 (1925).
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depending upon its interpretation of the statutes.41 In exercising its
discretion, Davis has suggested42 that the court be guided by four
criteria: Comparative qualifications of the court and the administrative
body; legislative intent; whether a new proposition of law is being
applied; and the court's confidence in the agency.
Considering these criteria, perhaps the Vires and Aetna cases can
be explained on the theories that the court believed the board to be
more competent than the court to make the determination on the
employment contract issues, or that this was a matter intended by the
legislature to be left to the determination of the board. If such were
the reasons behind the decisions, it is unfortunate that the court failed
to make them clear.
Certainly on the question of whether a person is an employee or
independent contractor, the court is more competent than the board
to make the determination, or is at least as competent as the board.
Therefore, the only reasonable basis for the court's action is that it
considered this as a matter intended by the legislature to be left to
the board's determination, or because of the court's confidence in the
board it refused to substitute its judgment.
It seems doubtful that the legislature would have intended the
board to make the determination in these instances and not have the
exclusive determination in matters of dependency, extent of disability,
whether horseplay had ended, etc. As to the matter of confidence, it
is again unreasonable that the court would have more confidence in
the board's determinations on the issue of employment than in the
other situations. Certainly these two cases present an anomaly in the
general rule and treatment of the cases on the matter of scope of
judicial review.
In Rex-Pyramid Oil Co. v. Morgan,43 the board determined upon
undisputed facts that the employee was killed while engaged in horse-
play. The court reviewed this as a question of law and held that the
horseplay had ended and the employee was within his employment
at the time of the accident. Analytically, whether or not a person
is engaged in horseplay is a question of fact, or at least a mixed
question of law and fact. It is submitted that this is a question in
which the board is as competent to make a determination as the
court, and also one in which it would be more reasonable to conclude
that the legislature intended to leave to the determination of the board.
In this and similar situations it would be reasonable for the court to
"DAvis, Am s rm LAW, Chapt. 20 (1951).
"DAvis, op. cit. supra at 927 (1951).
"287 Ky. 459, i53 S.W. 2d 895 (1941).
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defer to the board's judgment and review the board's determination
to see if it had support in the record and was rationally permissible,
and refuse to substitute its judgment for the board's even though the
court might reasonably have held otherwise on the facts.
In reviewing determinations upon undisputed facts it is difficult
to predict what the court's future action will be. With the Vires and
Aetna cases still alive and existing authority there is a possibility that
the court may extend their principle and take a more liberal view
toward the Workmen's Compensation Board's determinations and
defer to the judgment of the board in other situations. However, since
the two cases are relatively old and their principle has not been
extended as yet, it is reasonable to conclude that the court will continue
in its general practice of reviewing the board's determination upon
undisputed facts as questions of law.
Perhaps these two cases were never intended as an exception to the
general rule. They are instances where the court was confusd as to
the exact extent of its review. In each case, agreeing with the result
reached by the board, the court in its attempt to affirm the action of
the board used unfortunate language. It did not intend to establish
the proposition that in these instances the board's conclusions would
be binding upon it and its judicial review, complete upon determining
that the order was supported by substantial evidence.
In conclusion, matters traditionally considered as questions of 'law"
can often be considered as questions of fact upon the court's determi-
nation that they are matters which should be left to the board's
determination either because of a matter of policy or because it was
so intended by the legislature. It is submitted that in some instances
it would be reasonable and perhaps in accord with the legislative
intent for the Kentucky courts to defer to the judgment of the board
issues which are peculiarly within the knowledge of the board, or
which require the finding of a certain factual relation from undisputed
facts. But it seems unreasonable that the Kentucky court would con-
sider the board's determination binding upon it in a determination of
the employment status and not binding upon it in the other situations,
some of which more nearly resemble factual determinations. There-
fore, it is felt that the Kentucky courts will continue their practice of
reviewing the board's determinations upon undisputed facts as pre-
senting questions of law, and that such should be the practice even in
the cases involving determinations of employment relationships.
CONLE WMKERSON
